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Abstract. Several papers have already shown the interest of using mul-
tiple classifiers in order to enhance the performance of biometric person
authentication systems. In this paper, we would like to argue that the
core task of Biometric Person Authentication is actually a multiple clas-
sifier problem as such: indeed, in order to reach state-of-the-art perfor-
mance, we argue that all current systems , in one way or another, try to
solve several tasks simultaneously and that without such joint training
(or sharing), they would not succeed as well. We explain hereafter this
perspective, and according to it, we propose some ways to take advantage
of it, ranging from more parameter sharing to similarity learning.
1 Introduction
Biometric authentication is the task of verifying the identity of someone accord-
ing to his or her claim, by using some of his or her biometric information (voice
record, face photo, fingerprint, etc). A Biometric authentication system is thus
trained to accept or reject an access request of one of the registered clients.
This can be done efficiently by solving a two-class classification problem for each
client separately.
When using more than one biometric information [1–3], the underlying ver-
ification system is said to be a multiple classifier system, as it merges several
data sources coming from various biometric scanning devices, and hence, fits
very well the topic of this workshop.
In this paper, we would like to argue that even when trying to solve a biomet-
ric authentication system based on a single modality and using a single classifier
per client, one still needs to solve several classifier tasks jointly in order to reach
state-of-the-art performance. We will argue in the following that there are sev-
eral ways to solve these tasks jointly, ranging from the so-called world model
approach, which is used to share common knowledge among several client mod-
els, to the learning of specialized distances or representation spaces, that can
then be used for each client to take an accept/reject decision.
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The paper goes as follows: in Section 2 we explain the main argument of the
paper, giving several examples of how it is already used in the various state-of-
the-art approaches of the literature. In Section 3, we propose yet another way
to use this new perspective of the biometric authentication task, and finally, in
Section 4, we briefly conclude.
2 A Multiple Classifier Problem
The purpose of this paper is to show that the essence of a biometric authentica-
tion task is by nature a multiple classifier problem. This is not to be mixed
up with the fact that multiple classifier systems often yield better performance
for the task of biometric authentication [1–3].
Instead, we would like to advocate that, while biometric authentication can
be seen as a two-class classification problem (each access should either be ac-
cepted or rejected), it is in fact several two-class classification problems (one for
each client model) that are inter-connected to each other and one should take
this into account in order to better design such systems.
Indeed, the general setup of a biometric authentication task is to be able to
recognize whether a legitimate client is or is not who he or she claims to be by
showing some biometric information. The expected resulting system should be
able to accommodate for a growing number of clients3, and should be able to
enroll a new client with as little as possible of this new client’s biometric material
(be they voice, face, finger, or other modality prints).
2.1 Global Cost Function
The best way to illustrate that person authentication is a multiple classifier
problem is to look at how such systems are evaluated in the research commu-
nity. The most used measures of performance evaluate not only the performance
of a single client model, but that of a large set of client models. Furthermore, this
performance is not additive with respect to these apparently separate problems:
indeed performance measures in person authentication always involve informa-
tion such as False Acceptance Rate (FAR), False Rejection Rate (FRR), aggre-
gates of them such as Half Total Error rate (HTER) or Detection Cost function
(DCF) [4], and curves summarizing them, such as Detection Error Trade-off
(DET) [5] and Expected Performance Curves (EPC) [6]. In all these cases, the
global performance of a (set of) system(s) is not simply the sum of the perfor-
mance of each client model (as the number of accesses per client model, be they
legitimate or impostor, varies greatly from one client to another).
Hence, in order to train a good set of client models, one should select the
corresponding parameters in order to maximize the joint performance of all
models, and not separately the performance of each model. In this sense, it is
clear that one needs to solve a multiple classifier problem jointly.
3 It is expected that it should scale at most linearly with the number of clients, in
terms of training time, and should be constant in terms of access time.
2.2 Parameter Sharing
Furthermore, given the inherent constraints of biometric authentication systems
already discussed (scarce available data for each client, need for efficient access
time, etc) most (if not all) of the state-of-the-art approaches in biometric au-
thentication try to make use of a large quantity of previous client information in
order to build a generic model, out of which each new client model starts from.
In order to illustrate this phenomenon, we will concentrate on the task of
text-independent speaker verification, but bear in mind that the explanation
is valid for any biometric authentication system. We can divide most of the
current approaches into (apparently) generative approaches and discriminant
approaches4. Let us review these two broad families of approaches.
The most well-known generative approach and still state-of-the-art method
for text-independent speaker verification is based on adapted Gaussian Mixture
Models (GMMs)[8]. It starts by training by Expectation-Maximization a generic
GMM over a large quantity of voice data, and then adapts this generic model,
using for instance Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) techniques, for each new client.
Moreover, not only some parameters from the client model are adapted from a
generic model (this usually applies to Gaussian means), but several other pa-
rameters of client models are simply copied from the generic model (this usually
applies to Gaussian variances and weights). This approach turns out to be the
most efficient way to make the best use of the small amount of each client’s
information. Furthermore, it is also state-of-the-art for many other biometric
authentication problems, including face verification [9].
Several experiments have shown in the past that if one tries to solve the
speaker verification problem by training a new GMM for each client instead of
starting from a generic model and adapting it, then the performance results are
poorer, even when tuning the number of Gaussians for each client separately.
Other evidences of the same phenomenon can be seen in various enhance-
ments of the basic GMM based approach that have been proposed in the biomet-
ric authentication literature over the years, including the use of normalization
techniques (Z-norm, T-norm, etc) which aim at trying to normalize the ob-
tained score to make it more robust to several kinds of variations (intra-speaker,
inter-speaker, inter-session, channel, etc) [10]. Once again, in order to compute
efficient normalization parameters, one needs to use a large number of previous
client information. This has already been demonstrated empirically.
For instance, one can see in Table 1 and in Figures 1 and 2 the comparative
performance of three systems on the NIST database described in appendix A.
One system is trained using the classical EM training approach (also called
maximum likelihood approach, or ML), the second one is trained using the MAP
adaptation technique, and the third one is trained using MAP and applying the
T-norm normalization technique. Table 1 shows the a priori performance of all
three systems on the test set in terms of FAR, FRR, and HTER, after selecting
4 Note that actually, generative approaches that effectively work usually implement
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the threshold that minimized the Equal Error Rate (EER) on the development
set. Figure 1 shows the DET curves on the development set (the lower to the
left the better). Finally, Figure 2 shows the EPC curves on the test set. The
latter curves provide unbiased estimates of the HTER performance of all three
systems for various expected ratios of FAR and FRR (represented on the X-axis
of the graph by γ). The lower part of the graph also shows whether one of the
three models was statistically significantly better than another one, according
to the statistical test described in [11].
In all cases (table results, DET and EPC curves), it is clear that the more one
shares information among client models, the better the expected performance
on new client models becomes.
Table 1. Point-wise performance results, in terms of FAR, FRR and HTER (%),
on the test set of the NIST database using classical ML training, MAP training and
MAP plus T-normalization procedure. These results where obtained by selecting the
threshold that minimized the EER on the development set.
FAR FRR HTER
ML 3.23 30.80 17.02
MAP 4.79 16.38 10.59
MAP + T-norm 7.06 10.29 8.68
In all these cases, one could never obtain a good authentication system for
a given client if no information was shared among various clients. Hence, while
it is never explicitly said, all successful generative approaches to person
authentication systems are built by sharing some information among
several classifier systems.
While generative approaches have been used successfully for many years,
there are good reasons to think that direct discriminant approaches should per-
form better; one of them, advocated by Vapnik [12], is that one should never try
to solve a more difficult task than the target task. Hence if the task is to decide
whether to accept or reject an access, there should be no reason to first train a
generic model that describes everything about what is a correct access and what
is an incorrect access, as the only thing that matters is the decision boundary
between these two kinds of accesses.
More recently thus, several discriminant approaches have started to provide
state-of-the-art performance in various person authentication tasks.
For instance, the Nuisance Attribute Projection (NAP) approach [13] tries to
find a linear transformation of the access data into a space where accesses of the
same client are near each others, in terms of the L2-norm. In order to refrain
from finding an obvious bad solution, the size of the target space (or more
specifically its Co-rank) is controlled by cross-validation. This transformation is
learned on a large set of clients (hence, similarly to learning a generic GMM in
the generative approach). After this step is performed, a standard linear support
vector machine (SVM) [14] is trained for each new client over the transformed
Fig. 1. DET curves on the development set of the NIST database using classical ML
training, MAP training and MAP plus T-normalization procedure.
access data. This approach provided very good performance in the recent NIST
evaluations.
This shows even more the fact that one has to share some information among
many clients in order to obtain good performance. In this case, the shared in-
formation is used to learn how to transform the original data into a space which
will be invariant to various aspects, such as the channel, and concentrate on the
important topic, the client specific information.
Unfortunately, one thing in the NAP approach is somehow disappointing: the
transformation function is not learned using the criterion that is directly related
to the task; rather, it tries to minimize the mean squared distance between
accesses of the same client to get rid of the channel effect, but do nothing about
accesses from different clients for instance. In other words, we might still try to
do more than the expected task, which is not optimal, according to Vapnik.
Another recent approach that also goes in the right direction and that obtains
similar and state-of-the-art performance as the NAP approach is the Bayesian
Factor Analysis approach [15]. In this case, one assumes that the mean vector
of a client model is a linear combination of a generic mean vector, the mean
vector of the available training data for that client, and the mean vector of the
particular channel used in this training data. Once again, the linear combination
parameters are trained on a large amount of access data, involving a large amount
Fig. 2. Expected Performance Curves (EPC, the lower the better) on the test set
of the NIST database using classical ML training, MAP training and MAP plus T-
normalization procedure. The lower graph shows the confidence level of one model
being statistically significantly better than another one in each part of the EPC curve.
of clients. While this approach is nicely presented theoretically (and obtains very
good empirical performance), it still does not try to find the optimal parameters
of client models and linear combination by taking into account the global cost
function.
3 Similarity Learning
In this section, we would like to propose at least one idea that would directly
take into account the multiple classifier problem dimension of biometric authen-
tication tasks.
We advocated in the previous section that one should try to learn jointly
some information about several clients that would directly help in the final task
of accepting or rejecting accesses. We also advocated that a promising approach
should be discriminant, as the NAP approach is or similarly to Campbell’s poly-
nomial expansion for sequence kernel approach based on support vector machines
(SVMs)[16].
We also acknowledge that the SVM approach to speaker verification is dis-
criminant but given that each client SVM is trained separately, the currently
only parameters that can be shared among clients in this approach are through
the transformation of the input space (as it is done in the NAP approach)5.
We would like to propose here another discriminant method based on SVMs,
but that would use a particular kernel (or similarity measure between two ac-
cesses) that would be learned on several clients’ accesses. Indeed, if we knew in
advance a distance or similarity measure that would quantify reasonably well
whether two accesses are coming from the same client or not, and even assum-
ing this measure to be noisy, putting it into an SVM and training the SVM to
solve the final authentication task would yield a better performance than using
the standard Gaussian or polynomial kernel for the same task, as it is done in
Campbell’s approach for instance.
Hence, our proposed approach is the following. Using a large base of accesses
for which one knows the correct identity, train a parametric similarity measure
that will assess whether two accesses are coming from the same person or not.
That can be done efficiently by stochastic gradient descent using a scheme sim-
ilar to the so-called Siamese neural network [17] and a margin criterion with
proximity constraints, as follows.
Let φ(·) be a mapping of a given access into a space where two accesses of
the same client are near while two accesses from different clients are far. More
formally, given a triplet (x, x+, x−) such that x is a vector representation of a
given access, x+ is a vector representation of an access of the same client as x
and x− a vector representation of an access of a client different from that of x,
we would like the scalar product of the similar ones in the φ(·) space to be higher
than that of the dissimilar ones:
φ(x) · φ(x+) > φ(x) · φ(x−). (1)
Let φ(·) be a multi-layer perceptron (MLP), the following ranking loss func-
tion L [18–20] can be used to search for a good candidate for (1):
L = |1− [φ(x) · φ(x+)− φ(x) · φ(x−)] |+ (2)
where |a|+ = max(0, a).
Finally, let us consider for the moment that a given access can be transformed
into a vector representation using a trick such as the one used in Campbell’s
polynomial expansion approach [16]. That constraint could be relaxed to any
other sequence kernel technique that have been proposed in the literature, such
as in [7].
We now have all the ingredients to learn efficiently φ(·) by stochastic gradient
descent. One simply needs to prepare, out of a database of several client accesses,
a training set of triplets (x, x+, x−); one then needs to select a particular form
for the parametric function φ(·) noting that the only constrains here is that it
5 Actually, another way the SVMs share information among them is through the same
list of negative examples, or impostor accesses.
should be positive and differentiable with respect to its parameters (in partic-
ular, φ(·) can be non-linear, which is not the case for the NAP and Bayesian
Factor Analysis approaches). One can then train φ(·) using stochastic gradient
descent to optimize (2) on that data. The chosen loss function (2) involves a
security margin, as not only do we want similar accesses to be nearer each other
than dissimilar ones in that space, we also want the difference between the two
similarity measures to be at least 1 (or any positive constant, for that matter).
Once φ(·) is trained on a reasonably large database, one can then use it to
create the following kernel k for each client SVM, similarly to the NAP and
Campbell’s approaches:
k(x, y) = φ(x) · φ(y) (3)
which guaranties Mercer’s conditions for proper SVM training [14], as long as we
put some mild constraint on φ(·) such as being continuous and positive, which
is straightforward to enforce.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a somehow novel view of the task of biometric
person authentication, advocating that it should be solved by taking into account
that one needs to create simultaneously several two-class classifiers, one for each
client, and that parameter sharing of one sort or another during this process
is of paramount importance. We have shown that all currently state-of-the-art
approaches to several biometric authentication tasks are indeed following this
approach while never referring to it specifically. We have then proposed a novel
approach, based on learning a similarity measure between two accesses, trained
by a margin criterion on a large set of previous client accesses, that can then
be plugged in an SVM for each client to replace standard kernels such as the
polynomial or the Gaussian kernel. A nice extension of the following framework
could be to incorporate the transformation of an access (which is normally a
variable size sequence of feature vectors such as MFCCs) into a vector repre-
sentation. A standard Time Delay Neural Network (TDNN) [21] could be used
inside the φ(·) function to accomplish this.
A The NIST Database Used in This Paper
The NIST database used here is similar to the one described in [7] and its
description goes as follows: it is a subset of the database that was used for
the NIST 2002 and 2003 Speaker Recognition Evaluation, which comes from
the second release of the cellular switchboard corpus, Switchboard Cellular -
Part 2, of the Linguistic Data Consortium. This data was used as test set while
the world model data and the development data comes from previous NIST
campaigns. For both development and test clients, there were about 2 minutes
of telephone speech used to train the models and each test access was less than
1 minute long. Only female data are used and thus only a female world model
is used. The development population consisted of 100 females, while the test set
is composed of 191 females. 655 different records are used to compute the world
model or as negative examples for the discriminant models. The total number
of accesses in the development population is 3931 and 17578 for the test set
population with a proportion of 10% of true target accesses.
Table 2 gives a summary of the hyper-parameters used for GMM based ex-
periments after selection based on minimizing EER on the development set.
Table 2. Summary of the hyper-parameters for GMMs based systems on the NIST
database
ML Hyper-Parameters
# of Iterations # of Gaussians Variance Flooring (%)
25 75 60
MAP Hyper-Parameters
# of ML Iterations # of Gaussians Variance Flooring (%)
25 100 60
# of MAP Iterations MAP Factor Variance Flooring (%)
5 0.5 60
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